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CASE COMMENTS
HORIZONTAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS AND
THE PER SE RULE
In United States v. Sealy, Inc.,' a recent antitrust case before the
Supreme Court, it was argued hypothetically that a group of grocers
might engage in territorial restraints incident to the use of a common
name and common advertisements, and that such an arrangement would
not be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.2 It was further argued that
such an arrangement should be sustained because of the beneficial effect
on competition. 3 Although the Supreme Court struck down the practices
employed in Sealy, it stated that such a position certainly would not
require condemnation of the "quite different" grocer situation should it
ever arise.' This basic issue will be presented to the Sapreme Court in a
case arising from the Northern District of Illinois.5 The decision should
clarify the Court's position on horizontal territorial restraints, and it will
have important ramifications for small businessmen contemplating
cooperative efforts to compete more effectively with larger national
organizations.
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,6 the government sought to
enjoin, as unlawful under section one of the Sherman Act,7 the activities of
a cooperative distributor of private label grocery and other related non-
food products in allocating exclusive territories to its member food store
chains. Topco Associates, Inc., does not manufacture or process grocery
products; it procures and distributes under its own brand name exclusively
to its members. Utilizing their collective buying power, the members can
'388 U.S. 350 (1967). Sealy involved price fixing and market division among
manufacturers of bedding products.
215 U.S.C. § I (1964),formerly ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
3388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967).
41d.
5United States v. Topco Associates, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388,
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1970).
Direct appeal by the United States from the district court to the Supreme Court is
facilitated by the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964),formerly ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823
(1903), which provides:
In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States
under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an
appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the
Supreme Court.
15 U.S.C. § 29.
'5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388. (N.D. Il1. Nov. 16, 1970).
715 U.S.C. § 1 (1964),formerly ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
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support a private label program and market a line of quality controlled
goods which are cost competitive with the private brands of the larger
national chains.
The Topco cooperative is wholly owned and controlled by the member
firms who are independent grocers, operating under their own name.
There is no pooling of profits, capital or advertising efforts, and each
member is free to sell what he wishes, buy from whom he pleases, and
price his goods, including Topco brands, as he sees fit.
One of the most significant aspects of the Topco organization is the
practice of allocating exclusive territories. To become a member of
Topco, a firm must purchase a license which entitles it to the exclusive
right to sell Topco brands in its respective area, with the correlative duty
not to sell Topco brands outside that area.' It was this system of territorial
restraints which the government attacked as a violation of section one of
the Sherman Act (hereinafter section one).
The district court concluded that the territorial restraints incident to
the trademark licensing provisions were not inherently unreasonable and
had no substantial adverse effect on competition.9 By viewing the
territorial restrictions as subordinate to the otherwise legitimate, pro-
competitive purpose of the Topco cooperative, the court found no
violation of section one. 10 The case is particularly significant because the
court did not hold that the territorial restraints were per se violative of
section one as contended by the government.
The issues raised by the principal case present the recurring question of
what restraints of trade are prohibited by the Sherman Act. The language
of section one, literally interpreted, admits no exceptions; it forbids
"every contract . . . in restraint of trade . . ."" Yet, literal construction
has never been utilized by the Supreme Court in cases arising under
section one.' 2 From the Court's attempts to establish a workable formula
8Topco issues three types of licenses: exclusive, nonexclusive and co-extensive. An
exclusive territory is one in which the member chain has the exclusive right to sell Topco
branded products; a non-exclusive territory is one in which a member may sell Topco
branded products, but not to the exclusion of others who may be licensed to sell in the same
territory. Co-extensive territories are those in which two or more designated members may
sell Topco branded products to the exclusion of all others. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade
Cas.) 73,388 at 89,556-57.
'5 TRADE RaG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388 at 89,558.
I*Id. at 89,562.
"15 U.S.C. § I (1964),formerly ch. 647, § I, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations is declared to be illegal. ...
15 U.S.C. § 1.
'here is authority that such a literal meaning was given to the Sherman Act by Justice
Peckham in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897). See,
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in this area emerged special rules for construction and analysis of cases
arising under section one.
The basic concept behind these rules and the doctrinal starting point
for analysis of section one cases is the rule of reason. The term "rule of
reason" refers to a dichotomy of theory, the foundations of which were-
laid by the earliest antitrust cases.' 3 By equating "restraint of trade" with
unreasonable restraint of trade the Supreme Court has been able to escape
the encompassing mandate of section one that every agreement in restraint
of trade is illegal." Yet, at the same time the Court has viewed certain
restraints as so pernicious to competition that no justification or
reasonableness will save the agreement.' 5 This corollary of the rule of
reason, that some agreements are conclusively presumed to be illegal, is
referred to as the per se rule."
The rule of reason was first explicitly formulated in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States 7 where Chief Justice White stated the rule as follows:
". .. in every case where it is claimed that an act or acts are in violation
of the statute the rule of reason, in the light of the principles of law and the
public policy which the act embodies, must be applied."' 8 Application of
the rule as envisioned by Chief Justice White and applied in subsequent
cases,"1 requires an evaluation of the purpose and effect of the agreement
and the relative power of the parties in the determination of whether the
practices in question constitute an unreasonable, and thus unlawful
restraint of trade.2
e.g., M. HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 4-7 (1957). However, in a careful analysis of
Justice Peckham's language, Professor Bork shows that Peckham was not a mere literalist
who advocated a lexicographic interpretation of the Sherman Act. Bork, The Rule of
Reason, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 785 (1965).
'3E.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290 (1897). See also Bork, The Rule of Reason, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
"United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911); see also United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
Professor Bork suggests that Chief Justice White was able to deny that the Sherman
Act forbade every restraint by equating the term "competition" to rivalry between business
units, and that this view which White incorporated into the rule of reason was subsequently
accepted in the law. Bork, The Rule of Reason, Part 11, 75 YALE L.J. 377 n. 5 (1966).
"For example, in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir.
1898), modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft stated the
following about certain restraints which necessarily have a tendency to monopolize: "[T]here
is in such contracts no main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is permitted,
and by which its reasonableness is measured . See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
17221 U.S. 1 (1911).
11Id. at 66.
"E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
"Bork, The Rule of Reason, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 805 (1965).
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An often quoted statement of the per se rule appears in Northern
Pacific Railway v. United States2' where Justice Black stated that there
are certain agreements which, regardless of their competitive effect or
business expediency, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
thus illegal.22 Once it becomes established in the law that a particular
practice is a per se violation, the government need only prove the existence
of that practice to obtain a judgment,23 and the defendant is precluded
from introducing evidence to justify the practices or explain their overall
competitive effect.2 4
The factual situation in Topeco necessitates the application of these
basic concepts to an agreement whereby the parties allocate exclusive
territories among themselves. While the problem has never been presented
to the Supreme Court in a context similar to that of Topeco, the Court has
established guidelines in this area. Agreements to allocate territories have
been classified by the Court as either vertical?' or horizontal. 26 When the
parties to the agreement are located at different levels of distribution, as in
21356 U.S. 1 (1958).
2Id. at 5.
21A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES Of AMERICA 27 (2d ed.
1970). The evidentiary effects of the per se rules are illustrated by White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940). In Socony- Vacuum, the Court was not interested in the justification for the price
fixing or the fact that the prices fixed were reasonable. The per se rules may also be used as a
basis for summary judgment. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 13 (1958).
2'-he interplay between the rule of reason and the per se rules can produce confusion.
For example, when a case is presented in which an antitrust violation is alleged, it is not clear
whether the rule of reason is used to make the per se determination, or whether the rule of
reason applies only after the case survives the per se test. If it is said that the rule of reason
operates in every case, then the effect of the per se rule is to terminate the inquiry as soon as it
is determined that the particular case represents a situation traditionally viewed as a per se
violation. See, e.g., Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule-Preface and
Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 139-42 (1962). This view has been particularly
attractive, probably because the converse suggests that the per se determination is reached by
a process something short of reason, which of course, is not the case. It would seem more
accurate with regard to recent case law to view the application of the rule of reason to the
determination of whether the alleged restraint is ancillary and reasonable and thus, not
unlawful. For example, in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), Justice Fortas
stated: "[T]heir anti-competitive nature and effect are so apparent and so serious that the
courts will not pause to assess them in light of the rule of reason." 388 U.S. at 355. This
more than suggests that the rule of reason applies only after the case survives the per se test.
The distinction is interesting, but largely academic; regardless of the theory used, the effect
of the per se determination is to foreclose any inquiry into justification or reasonableness of
the restraint. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
25E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
'-E.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319
(1947).
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a manufacturer-distributor relationship, their agreement is said to be
vertically imposed.2Y On the other hand, horizontal agreements are those
executed among firms located at the same level of distribution, 2 such as
an agreement between two or more independent manufacturers.2 Critical
distinctions have resulted from these classifications. Vertical agreements
to allocate territories have traditionally been tested by the rule of reason;30
whereas, horizontal agreements are said to be per se violations of section
one. 3' The Court's rationale behind this distinction is that horizontal
restraints have no purpose but to eliminate competition, whereas vertical
agreements may or may not have that purpose. 3 It has been further stated
that vertical territorial arrangements may have valid business
justifications and are not necessarily undertaken for anti-competitive
purposes.3 While the vertical-horizontal distinction is by no means an
easy one to establish in every case, the Court has provided a paradigm for
analysis.
In Sealy, the most recent case to present the issue to the Supreme
Court, it was stated that the determination of whether an agreement is
vertical or horizontal results from an analysis of substance rather than
form.314 The government charged that Sealy had violated the Sherman Act
by conspiring with its manufacturer-licensees to fix the prices at which
retail merchants could resell bedding products bearing the Sealy name and
by allocating mutually exclusive territories among the licensees. Sealy, a
joint venture corporation whose stock was wholly owned by thirty
licensees, was managed and controlled by a board of directors chosen
exclusively from the licensees.3 The Court looked to what it called the
"central substance of the situation, not its periphery" and found that the
exclusive territories are necessarily chargeable to the licensees, whose
2Note 25 supra.
2E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
2'E.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). While Sealy is the most recent
horizontal case to appear before the Court, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951), is frequently cited as an example of a horizontal case.
"White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). It should be noted that White
has been limited by United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), where the
Court held that once title to the goods has passed, restraints on alienation are per se
unlawful; whereas, if the vertical agreement between the manufacturer and retailer is one of
sale on a consignment basis, the rule of reason applies. Id. at 381-82.
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The courts often use
"market division" interchangeably with "horizontal territorial agreement."
2White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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interests the arrangement promoted.36 Of particular significance in the
determination that Sealy was a horizontal case was the fact that licenses
were granted or withheld by the licensee-controlled board of directors.37
Even though Sealy was incorporated as a separate entity, the Court
concluded that it was an instrumentality of the licensees.38
Analysis of the Topco organization reveals the presence of each
element of the Sealy structure which led the Court to conclude that Sealy
was a horizontal case.39 Yet, the district court, in a departure from
traditional doctrine, did not declare the territorial restraints per se
unlawful as urged by the government.4 0 It found, pursuant to an
ekamination of power, purpose, and effect-the traditional elements of
inquiry under the rule of reason-that the restraints were lawful in light of
their overall pro-competitive effect.4 The question arises therefore,
whether the decision by the district court against the government can be
justified, in the face of substantial Supreme Court precedent that
horizontal territorial agreements are per se unlawful."
The district court in Topco failed to state whether it viewed the
agreement as vertical or horizontal or how it avoided the per se rule. A
possible basis for the decision-may lie in the case of Sandura v. FTC4 3
from which the court quoted in summarizing Topco's argument.4 In
Sandura it was held that the pro-competitive effects of a system of
exclusive territorial distributorships outweighed any adverse effect which
the arrangement might have had on intrabrand competition. 5 Sandura
was a floor tile manufacturer which allocated territories to independent
franchise licensees .4 While noting that the distributorships in Sandura
311d. at 353. The following language from Sealy further indicates what the Court means
by a horizontal agreement:
The territorial arrangements must be regarded as the creature of
horizontal action by the licensees. It would violate reality to treat them as
equivalent to territorial limitations imposed by a manufacturer upon
independent dealers as incident to the sale of a trade-marked product.
Sealy, Inc., is an instrumentality of the licensees for purposes of the
horizontal territorial allocation. It is not the principal.
388 U.S. at 354.
"Id. at 352.
381d.
3 'Topco is wholly owned by its twenty-five member licensees who hold all of its stock.
The cooperative is controlled by a board of directors composed of member-licensees, and
Topco officers are chosen from this board. The granting and withholding of licenses is also
controlled by the board.
"15 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388 at 89,562.
41
1d.
42E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
43339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
445 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388 at 89,561.
4339 F.2d at 857.
"Id. at 849.
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were conferred by the manufacturer rather than by a board of directors
composed of member-licensees as in Topco, the district court stated that
the cases were otherwise "virtually identical. 4 7 It would seem that the
court, after explicitly recognizing this distinction between Sandura and
Topco, would also recognize that the distinction was the major factor
which led the Supreme Court to conclude that Sealy was a horizontal
case. If the district court, as implied by its discussion of Sandura, viewed
the Topco agreement as vertical, then the holding on that issue cannot be
reconciled with the finding by the Supreme Court that Sealy was a
horizontal case.',
The district court also quoted from the opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States49 which sustained an
agreement between major producers of bituminous coal to establish a
selling agency with the authority to fix prices.0 The industry was in a state
of chaos due to diminishing post-war consumption, and the Court
perceived the need for intra-industry regulation to stabilize the bituminous
coal market.51 In upholding the agreement, the Court stated: "The mere
fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition between
themselves is not enough to condemn it."ft Although Appalachian Coals
has never been expressly overruled, it has been emasculated by the per se
concept as subsequently developed. The case was limited to its particular
facts in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.5 3 which held a similar
price fixing agreement per se unlawful. In Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc., v.
FTC,'4 the court held, on facts analogous to Appalachian Coals, that the
agreement in question constituted a per se violation. The defendants
attempted to rely upon Appalachian Coals, to which the court stated the
475 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) ' 73,388 at 89,561.
'"Justice Harlan, dissenting to the majority of six, viewed Sealy as a vertical
arrangement and stated that the particular relationship between Sealy and the licensees
should only be one factor in the consideration of whether the restraint is an unreasonable
one. Justice Harlan focused particularly on the fact that Sealy itself was an entity with
legitimate business purposes of its own, whose activities have been directed not toward
market division among licensees but toward obtaining additional licensees and more
intensive sales coverage. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 361 (1967). It is doubtful
that the Court will retreat from the position clearly enunciated in Sealy in 1967, and adopt
Harlan's view, which would require drawing such distinctions as horizontally imposed
vertical arrangements. Such distinctions would do little more than inspire ingenious counsel
to contrive corporate organizations to fit the distinctions. It would seem more rational to
avoid such distinctions and focus on the propriety of the per se rule itself.
49288 U.S. 344 (1933).
55 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388 at 89,560-61 (N.D. !11. Nov. 16,
1970).
11288 U.S. at 361.
72Id. at 360.
-310 U.S. 150 (1940).
"'256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958).
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following: "What contrary suggestion may be found in Appalachian
Coals. . .has not survived the strong and consistent course of subsequent
decision." The fact that the authorities cited by the district court in
Topco do not support the result reached does not, however, dispose of the
question of the propriety of the per se illegality of agreements such as
Topco.
The attempt to determine the Supreme Court's rationale underlying
the per se approach to horizontal territorial restraints reveals only a few
vague and brief statements about antitrust policy. For example, in White
Motor Co. v. United States,6 Justice Douglas characterized horizontal
t6rritorial restraints as "naked restraints of trade" with no purpose except
the stifling of competition. 57 Perhaps Justice Harlan gave the most direct
statement of the reason when he stated that territorial divisions prevent
open competition among parties who would otherwise be competing
among themselves .58
The Court has also given a non-economic justification for the per se
approach. In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States,7 Justice Black
listed those restraints which have been viewed as per se violations."° He
stated that the per se approach makes the types of restraints of trade
prohibited by the law more certain and avoids complex and protracted
litigation.6 This rule of thumb approach may simplify antitrust litigation
in some areas; yet, it is doubtful that expediency alone should support the
existence of a conclusive presumption of illegality.6"
Thus, the extent of the Court's economic justification for the per se
rule against horizontal territorial restraints is that they stifle and prevent
open competition.63 Since the Court has provided no definition of
51ld. at 541.
-372 U.S. 253 (1963).
'11d. at 263.
-388 U.S. 350, 359 (1967).
51356 U.S. 1 (1958).
" In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957), Justice Black stated the
following:
Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210; division of markets, United States v.
Addyston Pipe &Steel Co., 85 F. 271, affd, 175 U.S. 21 I;group boycotts,
Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457; and
tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392.
356 U.S. at 5.
"Id. at 5.
"Cf. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1151, 1171 (1952).
"United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 359 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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competition," any conclusion in this area must be based upon an inquiry
which goes behind the Court's language to the cases which gave rise to the
per se rule.
Even though it is often stated that horizontal territorial restraints are
per se unlawful, the Court has never been presented with a case involving
that issue alone. Territorial allocation cases have generally involved price
fixing agreements among parties with substantial and often dominant
market power. For example, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States'5 the Supreme Court condemned a price fixing and market division
agreement among manufacturers'supplying about two-thirds of the steel
pipe in the United States. Similarly, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States" condemned price fixing and allocation of market territories
among dominant American, British and French producers of roller
bearings. The same result has been reached in several lower court cases
involving territorial restraints or agreements not to sell to a competitor's
customers .
7
In Sealy the Court did not discuss market power, but viewed the
extensive price fixing and territorial allocation agreement as an
"aggregation of trade restraints" similar to that condemned in Timken. 68
The language in Sealy leaves little room for doubt that the decision was
besed on more than the presence of territorial restraints: "It may be true,
as appellee vigorously argues, that territorial exclusivity served many
"Professor Bork suggests the following theory concerning the Court's use of the term
"competition":
As so used "competition" does not mean the presence in a market of
a sufficient number of sellers to insure competitive behavior but merely a
condition of rivalry between business units. This distinction corresponds to
the semantic shift between Peckham in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic
and White in Standard Oil and American Tobacco. Peckham was able to
read the Sherman Act as forbidding every agreement in restraint of trade
by equating that phrase to the elimination of a competitive structure.
White was able to deny that the statute forbade every restraint, without
changing Peckham's test, by equating the term to the elimination of
rivalry. In accordance with White's usage, which has become accepted in
the law, references in this article to restrictions or eliminations of
competition are to be taken to mean restrictions or eliminations of rivalry.
Bork, The Rule of Reason, Part 11, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 377 n. 5 (1966).
-175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"341 U.S. 593 (1951).
"United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), affd, 332 U.S. 319
(1947); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Johnson
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1940), affd, 123 F.2d 1016 (6th
Cir. 1941). All of these cases concern arrangements affecting large fractions of market
supply.
"388 U.S. at 354.
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other purposes. But its connection with the unlawful price-fixing is enough
to require that it be condemned as an unlawful restraint . . .- 69 If
horizontal territorial restraints are indeed per se unlawful as traditionally
stated, then it would seem that the territorial agreement would have been
enough in itself to require a finding of illegality. Yet the Court felt
constrained to find more than territorial restraints in order to declare the
agreement unlawful.
The Court's refusal to accept the government's contention in Sealy,
that territoriality plus horizontality established a per se violation, has led
at least one commentator 70 to the hypothesis that exclusive territories
absent price fixing are arguably defensible. 71 An alternative hypothesis,
based on the language in Sealy and the absence of any prior cases which
actually hold that horizontal territorial restraints are per se illegal, would
be that there is no true per se rule in this area. But even if either of these
propositions is correct, the question remains as to the merits of refusing to
apply the per se rule to horizontal territorial restraints.
Topco presents a model case for the consideration of whether
horizontal territorial restraints are so pernicious as to warrant per se
illegality. The record in Topco is not complicated by any of the elements
characteristic of previous horizontal cases such as price fixing
agreements, 72 royalty or bonus sharing plans, 73 or dominant market
power. 74 Since the district court did not apply the per se rule, the record
provides a basis for analysis in light of the traditional elements of power,
purpose, and effect. If Topeo does not present a situation so detrimental
to competition that it should be conclusively presumed to be illegal solely
because of the horizontal nature of the agreement, then perhaps the per se
rule is inappropriate.
In determining whether an alleged restraint is reasonable, the Supreme
Court has distinguished between intrabrand and interbrand competition. 75
Intrabrand refers to competition between the same brand names, whereas
1'd. at 356.
71McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale
Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 237, 241-42 (1968).
7 tThe Court in Sealy more than hinted at the possibility when it stated that
condemnation of the practices employed by Sealy certainly would not require the same result
in the "quite different" grocer situation should it ever arise. 388 U.S. at 357 (1967). Cf.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). There the Court stated: "As a simple
example, if one of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the
buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors
were ready and able to sell flour by itself." Id. at 6-7.
'E.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
"E.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
74E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
7 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
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interbrand refers to competition between different brands. 76 While the
district court in Topco made no clear finding as to the effect of the Topco
agreement on intrabrand competition, it did state that even if intrabrand
competition were adversely affected, such effect was far outweighed by the
beneficial effect on interbrand competition. 77 It would seem that the
Topco agreement not only adversely affects intrabrand competition but
eliminates it, since the very effect of the agreement is to give the members
an exclusive selling area. Yet, brandname monopoly is no unusual
phenomenon in grocery or other markets. The larger national chains
operating under a single name have this advantage and the government
has conceded its legality.7
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,79 the Supreme Court
stated that any conclusion as to the fact that intrabrand competition is
substantially eliminated must be drawn in light of the interbrand
competition. 0 In Schwinn, the court considered the product market as a
whole and focused on the availability of reasonably interchangeable
products in the same market area."' The Court concluded that since other
bicycles were reasonably interchangeable for the Schwinn product and
since these substitutes were readily available from competing
entrepreneurs in the same area, interbrand competition was not adversely
affected . 2 Apparently the Court's definition of reasonably
interchangeable product in cases arising under section one does not take
into account such product differentiation variables as promotion,
advertising, labeling, and customer loyalty.8 The government sought to
use Schwinn's claim of product excellence to show that other bicycles were
not reasonably interchangeable. The Court rejected this argument and
explicitly stated that it did not regard Schwinn's claim of product
excellence as a refutation of its conclusion that other bicycles were
reasonable substitutes2u If the Court views other bicycles as reasonably
interchangeable for the "Schwinn Racer," then it would seem that the
available alternatives to Topco branded food items are also reasonably
interchangeable products.
The theory manifested in Schwinn that acceptable competition may
74Id.
175 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388, at 89,562.
731d.
7'388 U.S. 365 (1967).
"Id. at 38 1.
WId.
"ld. at 381-82.
3rThe problems involved in determining the degree of product differentiation and the
resulting complications are discussed in J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 23 (3d ed. 1967). Further
discussion appears in E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56-
64 (8th ed. 1962).
A388 U.S. 365, 381 n. 7 (1967).
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coexist with brand name monopoly is not without the support of a noted
economist. Professor Chamberlain's theory of monopolistic competition 5
includes the proposition that "[i]n this field of 'products' differentiated by
the circumstances surrounding their sale, we may say, as in the case of
• , . trade-marks, that both monopolistic and competitive elements are
present . . . . Each is subject to the competition of other 'products' sold
under different circumstances and at other locations . . ."I In Topco, as
in Schwinn, the brand name products were subject to the competition of
other similar products under similar circumstances in the same store as
well as in the same location.8 7 Therefore, the competitive elements which
were acceptable in Schwinn are equally present in Topco.
Market power has played a rather vague role in cases arising under
section one. Unlike merger" and single-firm monopoly cases, 9 the courts
do not discuss market power with any degree of particularity, nor do they
discuss in detail such concepts as per cent of relevant market in cases
arising under section one. Yet market power has been mentioned and
seems to have been a tacit consideration. In all of the previous cases
involving horizontal territorial restraints except Sealy, which additionally
involved a price fixing agreement, the parties to the arrangement were the
leading producers of their respective products.90 Likewise, horizontal price
fixing cases have involved parties with substantial market power. For
example, in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 9l.the defendants were
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of eighty-two per cent of the
vitreous pottery fixtures in the United States. Also, in United States v.
Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. 2 the defendant companies accounted for eighty-
three per cent of all gasoline sold in the Midwestern area during 1935. By
contrast, the Topco members are not leading sellers in their respective
areas. The district court found that retail sales of Topco members
accounted for an average of approximately six per cent of the total retail
sales in each Topco area.93 Of this six per cent, one-tenth is attributable to
Topco brands. Thus, of the total retail food sales in a Topco area, an
average of six-tenths of one per cent is attributable to Topco branded
1E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56 (8th ed. 1962).
"Id. at 63.
8 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388 at 89,557.
"E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
"E.g., United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
"Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
91273 U.S. 392, 394 (1927).
'2310 U.S. 150, 191 (1940).
935 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) " 73,388, at 89,561.
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products. Accordingly, it would seem that Topco members are not
dominant market forces.94
The district court in Topco determined that the intent of the agreement
by the members was not to restrain competition, but to market a line of
private brand names which were cost competitive with other lines of
private label goods.95 It is not suggested that a proper motive will save an
otherwise unlawful agreement, but, under the rule of reason, intent is one
relevant consideration along with market power and competitive effect.96
. Analysis of Topco on the basis of power, purpose, and effect reveals an
agreement among parties of relatively insignificant power to market a line
of private label products which only they can sell in their respective areas.
While the Topco agreement results in an area brand name monopoly,
there is no adverse effect on interbrand competition since reasonably
interchangeable products are readily available in Topco stores and from
competing entrepreneurs in the same area. Cooperative efforts such as
those presented in Topco provide the already vanishing small businessman
with an opportunity to maintain his corporate identity and survive in the
face of stifling competition from larger national organizations. If such an
agreement is automatically illegal, solely because Topco has effected it
horizontally, then antitrust doctrine actually enhances the position of
parties with real market power by preventing those who have less of it
from effectively competing.
While the district court in Topco may have reached a desirable result,
its failure to adequately deal with the per se problem adds to the
unpredictability and doctrinal chaos of antitrust law. It would be far more
desirable to face this issue and realign the law to correspond more
"Concerning market power, an alternative test utilizing the ability to restrict output has
been suggested. This theory would view horizontal agreements with suspicion only if the
parties had a large enough share of the market to alter total industry output by changing its
own output. This ability to restrict output is objectionable since it allows the party with such
power to misallocate resources, fix prices, and frustrate consumer want satisfaction. Bork,
The Rule of Reason, Part 11, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 394 (1966). Under this analysis Topco would
appear relatively harmless. The Topco members do not act in concert, nor do they have the
aggregate power to restrict output as required by this theory if they did.
355 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,388, at 89,558.
"The intention to fix prices manifested in Sealy is basically the only difference between
Sealy and Topco. Sealy had little aggregate market power; there was healthy interbrand
competition; equivalent brands were readily available in the same store; and the Sealy
agreement allowed the member licensees to compete more effectively in the national market.
Thus intention, as manifested by price fixing agreements, may well make a difference in
Topco.
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